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Summary: We conducted three experiments to examine the dynamics of a delayed-execute prospective memory task involving task
interruptions. In the delayed-execute paradigm, participants must delay a response until some future condition is met. After an
intention was formed to a salient cue, an interruption reduced prospective memory relative to a no-interruption condition.
Prospective memory for cues encountered during an interrupting task was worse than for cues occurring before an interruption,
but the location of the cue in either the ongoing task or the interruption did not affect prospective memory. Importantly, reinstating
the prevailing context after the interruption alleviated the negative inﬂuence of the interruption. Providing participants with infor-
mation about the future context for making the delayed-execute response also alleviated some of these deﬁcits presumably because
participants could encode more speciﬁc features of the performance context. These results highlight the potential importance of
contextual associations and reminders in completing everyday intentions successfully. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
A routine day for an administrative assistant, pilot, or
nurse involves performing several complex tasks separately,
switching between those tasks, and at times performing them
simultaneously. Performing multiple tasks interchangeably
typically requires more cognitive effort than either performing
them separately or switching between them. Multitasking per-
formance correlates positively with perceived multitasking
ability, but those perceptions are inﬂated (Sanbonmatsu,
Strayer, Medeiros-Ward, & Watson, 2013). Although many
individuals either consider themselves multitaskers or at very
least believe they can perform multiple tasks concurrently
fairly well, ‘supertaskers’, or those individuals with excep-
tional multitasking ability to perform certain tasks simulta-
neously without showing deﬁcits, represent less than 5% of
the population (Strayer, Watson, & Drews, 2011).
The fact that many individuals overestimate their cogni-
tive functioning for these tasks highlights the importance of
investigating how individuals formulate goals and future
intentions throughout a busy day while switching between
various activities. In most instances, following a daily plan
to manage one’s schedule allows an individual to anticipate
when one task will be completed and the next task will
begin. In other instances, however, task changes may be either
unpredictable or involuntary and thus represent unplanned
interruptions during a primary task that may impair perfor-
mance. Indeed, research on both task switching and interrup-
tions have revealed negative effects on prospective memory
(Einstein, McDaniel, Williford, Pagan, & Dismukes, 2003;
Finstad, Bink, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2006; Kliegel,
Mackinlay, and Jäger (2008); McDaniel, Einstein, Graham, &
Rall, 2004; McDaniel, Einstein, Stout, & Morgan (2003);
McNerney &West, 2007; West, Scolaro, & Bailey, 2011). Un-
derstanding how, and when, future intentions go uncompleted
can inform us about how to circumvent failures of either
encoding or retrieval. The goal of this set of experiments is to
understand the fate of fulﬁlling delayed intentions that we for-
mulate in the context of interruptions that occur so frequently
in our workplace environments.
The ability to fulﬁll future intentions is referred to com-
monly as prospective memory. Despite the fact that prospec-
tive memory is crucial to performing real-world tasks, and its
failures can cause many errors and serious accidents in work
place settings (Gawande, Studdert, Orav, Brennan, & Zinner,
2003; Grundgeiger, Sanderson, Venkatesh, & MacDougall,
2010; Liu, Grundgeiger, Sanderson, Jenkins, & Leane,
2009), relatively little is known about how people fulﬁll their
intentions successfully during everyday interruptions. The
laboratory paradigm that has come to dominate research in
this area attempts to simulate those real-world situations in
which a person is cognitively engaged in an activity and an
environmental event, or cue, appears during the task that is
part of a previously encoded intention (i.e., event-based
prospective memory). Many versions of experimental tasks
engage participants in an ongoing activity that requires
participants to press a key on the computer keyboard when
they encounter a cue in that ongoing activity (e.g., Einstein,
Holland, McDaniel, & Guynn, 1992; Ellis & Milne, 1996;
Maylor, 1996, 1998; Rummel, Einstein, & Rampey, 2012).
This traditional event-based paradigm, however, does lack
some features that are a representative of real-world prospec-
tive memory tasks, and therefore, simple modiﬁcations to the
paradigm allow ways to better simulate those situations. For
example, Einstein, McDaniel, and their colleagues noted that
the standard event-based prospective memory task does not
capture those instances in which a person wants to complete
an intention, but is temporarily prevented from doing so
(Einstein, McDaniel, Manzi, Cochran, & Baker, 2000). For
instance, seeing a coworker may trigger the intention to
deliver a message, but if that coworker is engaged in conver-
sation, fulﬁlling the intention may require one to wait and
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hold onto the intention until an appropriate moment arises.
Even if one could maintain the intention in working memory
over such short delays, the effect of real-world delays may be
worsened by interruptions from unexpected events (e.g.,
getting an important work-related phone call). Einstein et al.
(2003) have shown that interruptions like these dramatically
disrupt intention completion in various contexts and even for
intentions that are being maintained over very short delays
(see also Dismukes, Berman, & Loukopoulos, 2007; Shum,
Cahill, Hohaus, O’Gorman, & Chan, 2013).
The most commonmethod used to study delay and interrup-
tion effects on laboratory prospective memory performance is
the delayed-execute paradigm (e.g., Einstein et al., 2000). In
this paradigm, participants cycle through various ongoing
activities, which simulated multitasking contexts quite well
because tasks are repeated, interleaved, and allow opportuni-
ties for interruptions at various locations of a task. Prospec-
tive-memory cues used in this paradigm are typically salient
such as the onset of a red computer screen or an uppercase
word against all lower case words; high salience ensures that
virtually everyone will notice cues and will reencode the initial
intention to respond after a delay. The design of the delayed-
execute paradigm prevents participants from responding to
the cue immediately, as they would in standard event-based
tasks, because responses must occur following and not during
a task. When participants see a cue and retrieve the general
intention they formed at the beginning of the experiment, they
must instead formulate a delayed intention to wait until the
current ongoing activity changes and provides an opportunity
to respond.1 In essence, the delayed-execute paradigm
represents a unique combination of both event-based (e.g.,
salient cue that signals the retrieval of the delayed intention)
and activity-based (i.e., memory to fulﬁll the intention after
completing another task) prospective memory. See Brewer
et al. (2011) for a comparison of these intentions.
Because the earlier studies on the negative effect of
interruptions on delayed prospective memory, some research
has manipulated aspects of the interruptions in an effort to
understand how they affect performance. McDaniel et al.
(2004) replicated the task-interruption effect reported by
Einstein et al. (2003) and veriﬁed that the duration of
retention interval from cue occurrence to task change does
not change performance in younger adults. Moreover, the
duration of the interruption did not seem to impair perfor-
mance. Such performance following interruptions might be
a favorable representation of typical everyday behavior
especially because Dodhia and Dismukes (2009) found that
participants frequently fail to return to interrupted tasks
spontaneously. Because previous research using the delayed-
execute paradigm reinstated the interrupted task and this spon-
taneous reinstatement represents only a subset of our daily ac-
tivities, we wanted to investigate the effect of contextual
reinstatement on delayed/interrupted intentions. In addition
to contextual reinstatement effects, we also extended the extant
ﬁndings by examining the timing of the interruption in relation
to the occurrence of the salient cue. More speciﬁcally, we
included conditions where the prospective memory cue (which
signals the formulation of the delayed intention) occurs in the
interrupting task itself. This could very easily occur with our
everyday intentions (e.g., hearing your coworker’s name while
engaged in an interrupting phone call). Ultimately, under-
standing how intentions are completed relative to interruptions
is the goal of the present research.
An answer to this empirical question depends on what
theoretical mechanisms operate over the interval from cue onset
to task change. Einstein et al. (2003) favor the idea that an inten-
tion comes to mind periodically rather than being maintained
actively through rehearsal. Because intentions likely undergo
decreased activation from moment to moment, reinstating the
context of the ongoing task in which the cue occurred may
promote retrieval, which may be crucial for prospective mem-
ory success. Evidence supporting this perspective includes
research demonstrating that event-based prospective memory
performance is better when an intention is linked to a particular
context and a cue occurs in that context (Nowinski &
Dismukes, 2005) or when the intention to respond during a
window of time occurs during an expected context (for time-
based prospective memory; Cook, Marsh, & Hicks, 2005). If
intentions are, or can become, associated with contexts, then
resuming the ongoing activity after the interruption may
partially reinstate the intention when the cue appeared in that
same activity before the interruption. In other words, resuming
the ongoing task may trigger remembering of the intention
because the prospective memory cue shares that same task
context. Anecdotally, this is likely why, upon forgetting an
intention, one may return to a previous location once occupied
while the intention was encoded (e.g., the room in which one
formed the intention to give the coworker a message). Thus,
although research shows that interruptions generally have dele-
terious effects on prospective memory, the associative
reminding that occurs because of the shared task context be-
tween the ongoing task and the newly formed intention may
ameliorate that negative effect when the original task context
(e.g., the room) is reinstated upon returning to the ongoing task.
A cue that occurs during an interrupting task may also
result in an association between the intention and the
interrupting task itself, which terminates when the ongoing
task resumes after the interruption. In this case, there may
be no association, or a very weak one, between the intention
and ongoing task. Consequently, the deleterious effect of
remembering to fulﬁll an intention at the task change may
be greater when the intention is part of an interruption than
when the intention was formed as part of the ongoing task
before the interruption. In this case, returning to the ongoing
task would not serve as well as a reminder because the
association between intention and the ongoing task would
be nonexistent or weaker than when the intention is
formed in the ongoing task itself. In other words, the
inherent nature of interruptions may obviate beneﬁts
1 To avoid confusion in terminology for the remainder of the manuscript, we
wanted to clarify our use of certain terms. In past work using the de-
layed-execute paradigm (e.g., Einstein, McDaniel, Williford, Pagan, &
Dismukes (2003); McDaniel, Einstein, Graham, & Rall, 2004), the term re-
trieval is used to describe the instance when the participant encounters a salient
cue and retrieves the general intention that they are to respond when the task
changes. The authors also refer to the fact that salient cue signals the formation
of a speciﬁc intention over a delay given the current task context. Although the
use of these two terms is not necessarily synonymous, they both describe the
point in time during the ongoing task when the participant encounters the sa-
lient cue and initiates the delayed intention. Thus, when we use variations of
the word form in the current discussion, we are not referring to the initial
encoding of the general intention that occurs before the onset of the task.
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resulting from contextual reinstatement, because in real
life, they are returned to rarely, unless perhaps they need
to be completed again.
Other ﬁndings from the prospective memory literature are
consistent with such a prediction about the activation of
intentions. For example, the intention-superiority effect
represents the ﬁnding that memories about intentions may
reside with an above-baseline level of activation and may
be revived into working memory more quickly than non-
activated intention-related stimuli (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993;
Marsh, Cook, Meeks, Clark-Foos, & Hicks, 2007; Marsh,
Hicks, & Bink, 1998). However, Marsh et al. (1998) discov-
ered that intention completion leads to inhibition of
intention-related stimuli. The task switching literature on
backward inhibition in particular supports the prediction that
the abandoned interruption will be inhibited in service of
performing a new task (Mayr & Keele, 2000). To the extent
that completed tasks are indeed inhibited, completion of
the interrupting task in which a cue occurred may also
inhibit the intention to respond because it is associated with
the interrupting task. More generally, the same predictions
could be made by appealing to the fact that the production
rule associated with the interrupting task would have to be
suppressed upon resumption of the ongoing task (Anderson,
1983; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). We test our predictions
in Experiment 1.
EXPERIMENT 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was three-fold, which we
addressed with a mixed design, plus a control condition.
First, we wanted to replicate the basic interruption effect
with our stimulus materials and procedures. Therefore, we
tested a control condition that received no-interruption and
compared it to two interruption conditions. Second, our
primary purpose of the experiment was to compare perfor-
mance when the cue occurred before the interruption (as in
previous work) versus during the interrupting task itself.
For the interruption conditions, we manipulated within-
subjects the presence of cues relative to the interruption;
four of the eight cues presented occurred before the interrup-
tion and four occurred during the interruption. This placement
of the cue within the interruption is a novel manipulation
within the delayed-execute paradigm. Third, we wanted to rule
out deﬁnitively that temporal location of cues mattered in the
delayed-execute paradigm. We used a between-subjects
manipulation of temporal location of cues in the ongoing task
or the interruption. Half of the participants saw four cues occur
early, whereas the other half saw four cues occur late in the
cue context.
If our procedures replicate previous research (Einstein
et al., 2003; McDaniel et al., 2004), an interruption that
follows a salient cue should decrease the probability of
remembering the delayed prospective-memory response. In
addition, if the theoretical premises discussed earlier are
borne out, then a cue that occurs during an interruption will
subsequently generate poorer delayed prospective memory
because any associations to the interrupting context do not
beneﬁt from reinstatement as they would for the ongoing
task or they are lost (and/or inhibited) when resuming of
the ongoing task. Finally, temporal placement of the cue
during an interruption should not matter if the results from
the previous studies on the delayed-execute paradigm
generalize to cues placed in the interruption itself. If tempo-
ral location does matter, then the standard laws of retrospec-
tive memory would predict better performance when the cue
appears late in the interrupting task because less time, or less
retroactive interference from subsequent trials, would cause
forgetting of the intention.
Method
Participants
Undergraduate students volunteered in exchange for partial
credit toward a course research requirement. The experi-
menter quasi-randomly assigned participants to one of the
three between-subjects conditions (control, cue early, and
cue late) based on their arrival at the laboratory and tested
them individually in sessions that lasted approximately
45min. In this experiment and those that follow, the number
of students tested per condition may vary slightly because
multiple experimenters contemporaneously rotated through
the three conditions and not all participants reported for
their appointments. The 88 participants were distributed
as follows: we tested 30 in the control condition, 31 in
the condition where the cues occurred early in the interrupting
task, and 27 in the condition where the cues occurred late in
that task.
Materials and procedure
We used a modiﬁed version of the experimental design used
by Einstein et al. (2003) and McDaniel et al. (2004). Because
of the complexity of the task, we attempt to provide sufﬁ-
cient detail about our materials and methods. Speciﬁcally,
we developed eight ongoing activities for our experiment:
(1) choosing the synonym of a word from among three alter-
natives; (2) choosing the antonym from among three alterna-
tives; (3) rating the similarity of pairs of words on a 7-point
Likert scale; (4) judging which of three lines was longest; (5)
rating the pleasantness of words on a 7-point scale; (6)
answering trivia questions that had three options; (7) solving
simple addition problems; and (8) solving simple subtraction
problems. The computer software ordered these eight tasks
randomly for a given block of trials, and then reordered them
randomly three additional times so that participants experi-
enced each of the eight ongoing activities in four separate
blocks. This provided 32 discrete phases of the experiment,
with each phase of the ongoing activity lasting 1min. Within
each ongoing activity, participants experienced 12 discrete
trials lasting 5 s each. For example, the participant was asked
to rate 12 different words for pleasantness before the
ongoing activity changed to a different task. Accordingly,
we created 48 unique trials for each of the trivia, synonym,
antonym, pleasantness, and words pair tasks. The software
dynamically chose these items as needed in a random order
anew for each participant tested. By contrast, the trials for
the addition, subtraction, and line length problems were
created online by the computer software and did so anew
for each participant as needed for each trial.
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Two salient prospective-memory cues appeared in each of
the four blocks of the eight unique ongoing activities, which
provided a total of eight cues for measuring prospective
memory. Numbering the ongoing activities sequentially
from 1 to 32, the cues occurred in activities 3, 6, 12, 15,
19, 23, 28, and 31. In order to make the cues salient for the
delayed-execute paradigm, they appeared in a salient red
print (cf. red screen used by McDaniel et al., 2004). When
participants in the interruption conditions were interrupted
while performing an ongoing task, the software cleared the
computer screen, issued a unique sound, and displayed the
message ‘Generate Associates with Experimenter’, which
prompted participants to turn to the experimenter and start
generating their ﬁrst semantic associate to words printed on
4’ × 6’ index cards presented to them. The computer paced
this task for the experimenter with short beeps at a 3-s space
so that participants generated 10 different associates for the
30-s interruption. When the interruption occurred, it replaced
six ongoing task trials, which would have also lasted 30 s.
Participants then returned to the ongoing activity they were
performing before the interruption and completed three more
trials. After these trials, participants began a new ongoing
task, at which time they were supposed to make their
prospective memory response. By contrast, these six trials
were not replaced by the interrupting task (e.g., generation
of semantic associates) for participants in the no-interruption
control condition. After completing the ongoing task, they
proceeded to the new task immediately. Please see Figure 1
for a basic schematic of this procedure.
We adopted the Einstein et al. (2003) salient red cue
methodology so that we could rule out potential differences
detecting cues as well as differences in forming delayed
intentions when the signaling cue appeared either in the
ongoing activity or in the interruption. There is evidence that
salient cues produce extremely good event-based prospec-
tive memory performance (e.g., Einstein et al., 2000; Smith,
Hunt, McVay, & McConnell, 2007). Although the interrup-
tion differs physically from the other cognitive tasks
performed, the use of a salient cue should create an involun-
tary capture of attention and thus greatly increase the
likelihood of spontaneous retrieval of the general intention
(see McDaniel & Einstein, 2000 for a summary of this idea).
Consequently, formation of the more speciﬁc delayed
intention should be comparably strong in the ongoing and
interrupting contexts. However, we do believe that the detec-
tion of non-salient or nonfocal cues, retrieval, or subsequent
formation of delayed intentions may be impoverished
differentially in these task contexts; see Ball, Knight, Dewitt,
and Brewer (2013) for similar arguments. After all, the very
nature of non-focal cues renders them more susceptible to
failures in cue detection and spontaneous retrieval of the
intention (Einstein et al., 2005, Experiment 5; Knight et al.,
2011; Marsh, Hicks, & Cook, 2006). Our interruption helps
maintain ecological validity and simulates the nature of
everyday interruptions that employees encounter while
working on computer tasks.
In the no-interruption control condition, the salient red cue
always occurred on Trial 3 (out of 12 trials) of the ongoing
activity. In the interruption conditions, cue location was
manipulated within-subjects such that four cues appeared
immediately before the interruption and four appeared
during it. As a shorthand notation, we will label these the
before and during conditions, respectively. The timing of
the cue was manipulated between-subjects such that cue
occurred early in both the ongoing task and the interruption
or late in both the ongoing task and interruption. Without
the control condition, this provided a 2 (cue location: before
vs. during interruption) × 2 (temporal location: early vs. late
cue) mixed design. In the early condition, the cue appeared
on Trial 3 of the ongoing task cue and the third semantic
associate card held up by the experimenter during the inter-
ruption, whereas in the late condition, the cue appeared on
Trial 10 of the ongoing task and the penultimate card of
the 10-card interrupting sequence.
Prior to commencing the sequence of ongoing tasks,
participants read instructions for all tasks from the computer
monitor. Experimenters reiterated the instructions, gave
participants a diagram of the task sequence, and further
explained the task until participants understood their task
clearly, especially for when they encountered a red cue word.
Figure 1. The top panel shows a block of eight ongoing tasks for the no-interruption condition. The salient cue (C) signals participants to
formulate the prospective response (R) to be executed when the computerized ongoing task changes. The bottom panel illustrates how the
salient cue could appear early (E) or late (L) in the task or the interruption. These locations of the cues in this ﬁgure are for illustrative purposes
only and do not reﬂect exact locations in the paradigm
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Experimenters explained carefully to participants that they
delay their prospective response (the ‘/’ key) until the
ongoing task changed. We gave further clariﬁcation that
the semantic-associate interruption did not count as a task
change (although a cue could occur during it, and if so, they
should respond at the next ongoing activity task change).
Similar to when the cue appeared in the ongoing task, when
it appeared in the interruption, participants’ prospective
responses should be delayed until a change in the ongoing
task occurred. Because of the complexity of the experiment,
the ongoing task did not commence until the experimenter
was convinced that the participant could explain exactly
what was asked of them to do using the experimenter’s
diagram. For additional clarity, the experimenter conﬁrmed
by direct questioning that the participant knew what to do
if the cue occurred before or during the interrupting task.
Immediately before the task began, the experimenter
removed the diagram and participants completed a 3-min
maze distractor activity.
Results and discussion
Unless otherwise speciﬁed with a p value, the probability of
a Type I error does not exceed the conventional 5%. We
summarize the data in the top portion of Table 1 as the
proportion of cues that elicited a delayed response within
the ﬁrst two trials after the task change. Late responses were
rare and their inclusion as correct does not signiﬁcantly
change the message provided by this stricter scoring. To
address whether our materials and procedure replicated
previous research showing that interruptions disrupt de-
layed-execute prospective memory, we compared the control
condition to the performance of the other two conditions
when the cue occurred before the interruption (columns
labeled before in Table 1). In order to determine if we could
replicate the Einstein et al. (2003) and McDaniel et al. (2004)
results, we conducted a planned comparison between the
control condition and the two interruption conditions and
found worse prospective memory for intentions formed
during an ongoing task that was later interrupted (M = 0.69,
SEM = 0.05) than not interrupted (M = 0.86, SEM = 0.05),
t(86) = 2.15, d = 0.51. Thus, our materials and procedure are
similar to those used in the two previous studies that our
current results should generalize.
The more important question addressed by the current
experiment is whether performance differed when the cue
occurred before or during the interrupting task. We excluded
the no-interruption control condition and conducted a 2 (cue
location: before vs. during interruption) × 2 (temporal loca-
tion: early vs. late cue) mixed-model Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA). A signiﬁcant main effect of cue location revealed
that the delayed intention suffered more when the cue
occurred during the interruption than prior to its onset,
F 1; 56ð Þ ¼ 25:89; η2p ¼ 0:32. However, there was neither a
main effect of temporal cue location (early vs. late), F
(1,56)< 1, ns, nor an interaction between the two variables,
F(1,56) = 1.01, ns. The absence of any main effect of tempo-
ral cue location (early vs. late) conceptually replicates past
work that shows duration manipulations relating to the delay
between cue onset and task change, or of the duration of the
interrupting task, do not matter in this paradigm. Based on
these data, that null effect also seems to generalize to cues
appearing in interruptions.
At this juncture, a reasonable explanation for these results
is that upon exiting the interrupting task, that context is
deactivated, or inhibited, in order to facilitate resuming the
ongoing task. That inhibition process appears also to deacti-
vate the intention that was formed during the interrupting
task. Of course, this interpretation is predicated on the
assumption that intentions can become linked to the context
in which they are formed. The next experiment addresses
this issue in more detail.
EXPERIMENT 2
Although previous research demonstrated the importance of
contextual associations affecting both time-based and
event-based prospective memory (Cook et al., 2005; Marsh
et al., 2006; Nowinski & Dismukes, 2005), contextual
associations have surprisingly not been investigated in
the delayed-execute/interruption paradigm. McDaniel et al.
(2004) and others always reinstated the same ongoing
activity that contained the prospective memory cue and
was subsequently interrupted, but their focus was not to
examine context or reinstatement effects. We, and others
(Einstein et al., 2003; McDaniel et al., 2004), have shown
the fragility of maintaining an intention over a delay, espe-
cially when one has been interrupted. Given the rich body
of literature on retrospective memory showing the beneﬁts
of encoding speciﬁcity (Thomson & Tulving, 1973), contex-
tual reinstatement of the context in which a cue occurs could
alleviate some of the negative effects observed in the
presence of interruptions or when intentions are held over a
delay without an interruption. Moreover, if contextual asso-
ciations can inﬂuence prospective memory when intentions
can be fulﬁlled immediately upon seeing a cue as in the
standard event-based paradigm, reinstatement effects might
prove particularly useful when maintaining an intention over
a delay and in the presence of an interruption.
Table 1. Average delayed-execute prospective memory performance
as proportions across the conditions of experiments 1–3
Experiment 1
Cue occurs early Cue occurs late
Before During Before During Control
0.68 0.43 0.70 0.34 0.86
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05)
Experiment 2
No reinstatement Reinstatement
Before During Before During
0.38 0.28 0.72 0.38
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Experiment 3
Cue occurs before Cue occurs during
Task Future task Task Future task
0.61 0.77 0.63 0.58
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
The terms before and during refer to the placement of the cue relative to the
interruption. Standard errors of the mean are in parentheses.
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Research on intentions in hospital settings also provides
some insight about the inﬂuence of contextual reminders
after interruptions. Liu et al. (2009) examined participants
who received blood for a transfusion and needed to validate
the blood bag for the patient. When the doctor interrupted
participants for a short duration and asked them to perform
another task, those who failed to validate the blood for the
patient typically did so because they allocated attention away
from the transfusion task and to the interrupting task.
Remembering to validate the blood bag was better, however,
when participants either self-initiated the retrieval of the
blood check or returned their attention to the transfusion
task, which allowed the blood bag label to cue their memory
to validate the blood. Thus, reinstating cognitive processes
about the transfusion task served as a useful cue for retriev-
ing the intention for some participants.
Previous studies may have examined the effects of inter-
ruptions in best-case scenarios because of the reinstatement
of the ongoing task that contained the prospective memory
cue. If so, a task change would prevent any contextual rein-
statement and potential reminding of an intention formed
during the ongoing task. If reinstating the same ongoing
activity does indeed inﬂuence performance by facilitating
memory for the intention, then those few trials that precede
the task change must be functionally important to perfor-
mance in the delayed-execute/interruption paradigm. More
speciﬁcally, if those trials serve to reinstate the context to
which the intention to respond is associated, then their
presence may be serving to ameliorate what otherwise would
be poorer performance without their reinstatement. We
designed Experiment 2 to test this idea by removing the trials
of the ongoing task that immediately precede the task
change. This modiﬁcation eliminated the delay between the
conclusion of the interrupting task and the critical task
change where a response is required. If intentions become
associated to the context in which participants form them,
then the straightforward prediction is that changing tasks
directly after the interruption (e.g., no reinstatement of the
context) will cause performance to suffer additionally
because the environment no longer provides potentially use-
ful retrieval cues. Because the context for intentions formed
during an interruption is not reinstated (but, likely inhibited),
performing the same or a different task after the interruption
should not inﬂuence prospective memory when cues
appeared in the interruption. By contrast, when the ongoing
task is not reinstated, the delay between the interruption
and the task change is reduced (albeit by only a few trials),
which could improve intention completion. Although Exper-
iment 1 would suggest that the duration of the delay would
not matter, this set of experiments are to our knowledge the
only ones that have examined prospective memory for
intentions formed during interruptions, so we wanted to test
this once again.
Method
Participants
Undergraduates volunteered to participate in exchange for
partial credit toward a course research requirement. Each
participant was tested individually in sessions that lasted
approximately 45min. For reasons that will become clear
when the results are described (i.e., for statistical power),
we tested more participants in the no-reinstatement condition
than in the reinstatement condition used in Experiment 1 that
has these intervening trials just before the task change. We
tested 50 participants in the former condition and 36 in the
latter condition.
Materials and procedure
The procedural details of this experiment were identical to the
condition in Experiment 1 for which a prospective cue
appeared early in the interrupting task and this was compared
within-subjects to when the cue occurred before the
interrupting task (four cues of each type as in Experiment 1).
In order to examine the effects of contextual reinstatement,
the computer software removed the three trials following the
interrupting task for the no-reinstatement condition. This
ensured that the no-reinstatement condition experienced a task
change immediately after the interruption ended. This modiﬁ-
cation removed only 15 s from the ongoing tasks on the eight
occasions when the salient cue occurred. Please see Figure 2.
Results and discussion
We summarize the results in the middle section of Table 1.
As can be seen from performance in the reinstatement condi-
tion (right side of Table 1), this condition replicated Experi-
ment 1 insofar as cues appearing during an interruption again
reduced prospective memory relative to cues appearing
before the interruption when the ongoing task was reinstated
after the interruption. Most importantly, performance was
dramatically worse when the ongoing activity was never
reinstated (left side of Table 1) after the interruption. In
fact, prospective memory for this condition was almost as
poor as when the cue occurred during the interruption itself.
These impressions were conﬁrmed with a 2 (cue location:
before vs. during interruption) × 2 (context: no reinstatement
vs. reinstatement) mixed-model ANOVA. The interaction
between the two variables was statistically signiﬁcant,
F 1; 84ð Þ ¼ 6:75; η2p ¼ :07 and will be explained after describ-
ing the main effects. Replicating Experiment 1, the within-sub-
jects main effect of interruption showed that delayed-execute
prospective memory was signiﬁcantly worse for cues
appearing during the interruption relative to before the inter-
ruption and in the ongoing task, F 1; 84ð Þ ¼ 22:10; η2p ¼ :21.
The between-subjects main effect of contextual reinstatement
also signiﬁcantly improved prospective memory relative to
no reinstatement,F 1; 84ð Þ ¼ 9:90; η2p ¼ :11. This main effect,
however, pools over the cue location conditions. Because the
interrupting task was never reinstated, a true contextual-
reminding effect is isolated speciﬁcally to a simple-effects
analysis of the before conditions that did and did not reinstate
the ongoing task context. Notably, the contextual reinstate-
ment reminder after the interruption signiﬁcantly improved
prospective memory relative to changing ongoing tasks after
the interruption, t(84) = 3.91, d=.86. By contrast, reinstating
an interrupted ongoing task did not help intention comple-
tion signiﬁcantly when cues appeared during interruptions,
t(84) = 1.22, ns. Thus, the origin of the interaction is due
to a beneﬁt of reinstating the ongoing task when the cue
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occurs in this same task. This reinstatement can serve to re-
mind participants of the intention after a disruptive interruption
because the content of the intention contains details about that
speciﬁc task context. In sum, interruptions hurt prospective
memory, and reinstating interrupted tasks can alleviate the
damage, but only when the cue occurs in the original context.
Another way to understand the interaction is to examine
the effect of interruptions (when cues occur before vs. during
them) when the interrupted ongoing task was or was not
reinstated after the interruption. As simple-effects analyses,
we further compared prospective memory performance for
the before versus during manipulation within each of the
reinstatement conditions. The paired-samples comparison
revealed that reinstating the context when the cue appeared
in the ongoing task after the interruption resulted in signiﬁ-
cantly better performance compared with switching to the
next ongoing task after the interruption, t(35) = 5.56, d=.93.
When we did not reinstate the ongoing task after the inter-
ruption, the comparable paired-samples comparison revealed
a nominal performance difference in favor of the cue
occurring before the interruption compared with during the
interrupting task, t(49) = 1.49, ns. Remember that in the
absence of reinstatement, this comparison allows us to test
whether prospective memory is worse for a cue before or
during the interruption, which we could not test speciﬁcally
in Experiment 1 because the ongoing task was always
reinstated. The larger sample size reﬂects the fact that we
continued to test participants in this condition to see if the
numeric difference might be signiﬁcant with more power.
However, even after testing 50 participants, we failed to ﬁnd
a statistically signiﬁcant effect so we stopped data collection.
Thus, the nature of the interaction was due to a reinstatement
beneﬁt.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the
reinstatement trials following the interruption are function-
ally useful when the cue had appeared in the ongoing task.
Those trials may serve as a simple reminder of the intention
to respond at the task change because the intention was
formed within the context of that speciﬁc task. In essence,
that contextual association is what makes those reinstatement
trials so useful. Whether participants are consciously
forming such an association between the cue and the context
is unclear. Research by Finstad et al. (2006) would suggest
this is unlikely unless participants are speciﬁcally asked to
do so, although the purpose of the next experiment will be
to examine that issue in more detail.
Nevertheless, we replicated the very poor performance
when intentions are formed during an interruption in the
reinstatement and the no-reinstatement conditions of this
experiment (albeit nominally so when no reinstatement
occurred). One could have predicted very high levels of
performance in the condition when the ongoing task was
not reinstated and the cues occurred in the interruption
(i.e., that would have mirrored the control condition of
Experiment 1) because nothing intervenes between the
interrupting task and the critical task change itself. This
outcome, however, did not occur. One hypothesis is that
participants may deem the interrupting task as just that,
an annoyance that they must deal with before resuming the
main part of the experiment. As such, they may execute a rapid
inhibition of that task much like the work in the intention-
superiority literature. Nonetheless, Experiments 1 and 2
together demonstrate that cues occurring during an interrup-
ting task can become ineffective to prospective memory
processes over time.
EXPERIMENT 3
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to explore further the
idea that the intention is associated to a particular context.
Theoretically, we have assumed that the results from
Experiments 1 and 2 are consistent with the idea that the
intention to respond is associated to the task in which the
cue occurred; it is bound to its context. When the cue
appeared before the interrupting task, the intention to press
a special key at the task change is associated with the ongoing
task, which may or may not resume immediately for a
short duration after the interruption. By contrast, when
the cue appears during the interrupting task, that particular
context is no longer contextually relevant to performing
the subsequent ongoing task. The absence of reinstatement
would seem to explain, partially anyway, why performance
is worse when cues occur in interruptions. Due to the
randomized task sequence, one difﬁculty for participants
in the delayed-execute paradigm is predicting the next task
they will switch to when the critical task change occurs.
Therefore, the intention to respond at the task change can
only be associated with a vague notion of the task changing
or with termination of the current task. As discussed earlier,
some recent reports argue that being able to associate the
fulﬁllment of an intention with a future context (as opposed
to the current context) actually improves performance when
that context is correct, but has a deleterious effect when that
expectation is incorrect (Cook et al., 2005; Nowinski &
Dismukes, 2005).
Figure 2. This schematic represents the basic paradigm for Experiments 2 and 3. The salient cue (C) appeared in either the ongoing task or the
interruption. Upon seeing the cue, the prospective response (R) is formulated to be executed when the next task begins. The ﬁrst part half
shows how the interrupted ongoing task was reinstated after the interruption, whereas the second half shows how it was not reinstated
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If this theoretical assertion is true, then telling participants
exactly which ongoing task they will change to may enable
them to anticipate and to plan for it (for a similar explana-
tion, see Brewer et al., 2011). For example, if the salient
red cue word is the word ‘subtraction,’ participants can form
the more speciﬁc intention to respond when the task changes
to the subtraction task. We hypothesized that this additional
elaboration could ameliorate the interruption effect just as
contextual reinstatement ameliorated the deleterious effect
of an interruption in Experiments 1 and 2. Theoretically, this
manipulation of providing the future context is very similar
to establishing an implementation intention (Gollwitzer,
1999; Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998; Rummel et al., 2012).
Performance is poorer for standard intentions such as
planning to take vitamins everyday as compared with imple-
mentation intentions in which the context and behavior is
planned in much more detail (e.g., planning to take one’s
vitamins everyday at the breakfast table just before clearing
the dishes). Of particular importance to our research
question, Rummel et al. demonstrated that implementation
intentions improve prospective memory performance due to
the spontaneous retrieval of the intention. For an intention
that gets interrupted and requires a delayed response, know-
ing the nature of the future task change could allow partici-
pants to formulate a more speciﬁc intention that could be
retrieved more spontaneously upon changing tasks, which
could help protect participants from the negative effects of
interruptions in their environment.
Although Dodhia and Dismukes (2009) did not study
implementation intentions like Rummel et al., 2012, our
manipulation is also similar to thinking about returning to
an interrupted task. In their Experiment 1, they point out that
forgetting to return to an interrupted task might result from
distractions or task demands that follow an interruption.
Participants in an encoding-reminder condition saw a 4-s
explicit reminder to return to the ongoing task before the
interruption began, whereas those in an encoding-pause
condition experienced the same 4-s pause, but without an
explicit reminder. They showed that an opportunity to
remind oneself to return to the interrupted task during a
delay before the interruption occurred, either explicitly or
self-initiated reminding, increased the likelihood of returning
to the ongoing task.
Our motivation is somewhat similar to Dodhia and
Dismukes (2009, Exp. 1), so we should explain how our
manipulations are both similar to and different from their
work. Whereas they focused on understanding how interrup-
tions in our daily lives can create opportunities for us to form
an intention to return to the interrupted task, our general
focus for all our experiments was on forming intentions to
respond at a future task change. For this experiment in
particular, we wanted to examine whether knowledge about
the future task change could improve prospective memory
for responding at the task change similar to how they found
reminding participants to return to the ongoing task improved
memory for doing so. Although the properties of the intentions
differ between our study and theirs, the general principle of
reminding should operate similarly in this new experimental
context. If thinking about returning to an ongoing task
increases the likelihood of returning to that task, we believe
that knowledge about the future context that will occur after
an interruption should also serve to remind participants about
the intention when commencing a new ongoing task.
Although our predictions are straightforward, knowing
that future task might not improve prospective memory.
Knowledge about the future task might set in motion an
endogenous preparation for that new task, which could cause
backward inhibition of the interruption and its contents (the
during condition) and perhaps the contents from the
interrupted task (the before condition). Because backward
inhibition should not be as strong when the future task is
not predictable (Hübner, Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe,
2003), not knowing the future context might lead to better
prospective memory.
In this ﬁnal experiment, we manipulated context associa-
tion by issuing half of the prospective cues with no knowl-
edge of the particular future task (just as in Experiments 1
and 2) and the other half by providing the name of the
task that would occur at the task change. In order to obtain
a more sensitive measure of the effect of future context, we
manipulated this knowledge within-subjects and manipu-
lated whether the cue occurred before versus during the
interrupting task between-subjects. Whether making a spe-
ciﬁc association to the future context differentially amelio-
rates performance in a delayed-execute paradigm when the
cue appears before versus during the interruption is unclear.
One might predict that it could improve performance more
when the cues occurred during the interruption because this
is where performance is worst and perhaps most likely to
beneﬁt from an association or spontaneous retrieval. Alterna-
tively, depending on the cognitive processes that cause
worse performance when the cue occurs in the interrupting
task (e.g., inhibition), no improvement may be found or the
association might have a negative inﬂuence. If found, this
result may provide evidence that the interruption and its
contents, which include the intention, are inhibited and/or
that spontaneous retrieval may not occur for intentions that
are formed as part of an interrupting task. This ﬁnal manipu-
lation should lead to some additional theoretical insights as
to what causes the very poor performance that we have
repeatedly observed when the cues appear in interrupting
tasks. In this experiment, we wanted to examine whether
encoding information about the upcoming task improves
the completion of delayed/interrupted intentions in the
absence of the deleterious non-reinstatement effects found
in Experiment 2. Thus, we reinstated the ongoing context
for all participants as was done in the Einstein and
McDaniel studies.
Method
Participants
Undergraduates volunteered in exchange for partial credit
toward a course requirement. As in Experiment 1, experi-
menters quasi-randomly assigned participants to the two
between-subjects conditions. Due to a calculation error and
for two participants with outlying performance on the syno-
nym task, ﬁnal sample sizes resulted in only 30 participants
who encountered all eight cues before the interruption and
36 who encountered all eight cues during the interruption.
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Materials and procedure
The procedure was identical to the conditions in Experiment
1 that received an interruption, except in the following three
respects. First, because location of the cue in the interrupting
task had no effect in Experiment 1, we presented the cue
early in the interruption because its location was temporally
closer when the cue occurred before the interruption.
Second, in Experiments 1 and 2, the salient red cue was a
word on the computer screen or the word from which partic-
ipants generated their associate response in the interrupting
task. In this experiment, we added an additional red word
to the computer screen or to the index card, depending on
the condition. When no knowledge of the future context
was provided, the cue word was ‘task’ printed in red either
at the bottom of the screen or on the index card. When a
future context was provided, the red word named the speciﬁc
task that would occur at the task change (for example,
antonym, line length, etc. depending on randomization).
We informed participants of the differences between these
two types of cues, but explained speciﬁcally that they should
respond identically at the critical task change. Importantly,
we did not give any implementation intention instructions
like Einstein et al. (2003) attempted; and thus, any differ-
ences between the two kinds of cues are due to spontaneous
cognitive processing of knowing (or not) what the task
change will be and encoding that context as part of the
intention. Third, and ﬁnally, we manipulated whether the
cue appeared before versus during the interruption as a
between-subjects variable and the speciﬁcity of the future
context as a within-subjects variable.2
Results and discussion
We report results at the bottom of Table 1. The left-hand
columns summarize performance when the cues occurred
prior to the interruption and the right-hand ones summarize
when they occurred in the interrupting task. The 2 (cue
location: before vs. during interruption) × 2 (association:
task vs. future task) mixed-model ANOVA revealed a
statistically signiﬁcant interaction between the two variables,
F 1; 64ð Þ¼6:05;η2p¼:09, but neither main effect was statisti-
cally signiﬁcant; larger of the two, F(1,64) = 1.70, ns. The
interaction arose because associating an intention with a
speciﬁc future task facilitated performance when the cue
occurred in the ongoing activity, t(29) = 2.57, d=. 48, but not
when the cue occurred during the interruption, t(35)< 1.
Providing the speciﬁc context about a future task may act
like an implementation intention and help prospective mem-
ory for cues outside of the interruption. However, the same
association does not seem to beneﬁt intentions formed during
an interruption. Of course, the reader will notice that perfor-
mance for cues that occurred during the interrupting task is
much better than in Experiments 1 and 2. Because providing
a speciﬁc context versus not was a within-subjects manipula-
tion in this experiment, that manipulation may have changed
fundamentally how participants approached the task.
One way to explain this pattern of results is that partici-
pants formed associations that are more speciﬁc even in the
absence of knowing the exact context that would constitute
the task change. Perhaps the outcome in this experiment is
a function of introducing participants to the notion that
contextual associations can be used to improve prospective
memory performance; they might not know this on their
own. Alternatively, participants might not attempt to make
such associations without some degree of certainty about
the ordering of multiple tasks. Previous work showed that
an incorrect contextual association hurts prospective mem-
ory is a strong demonstration that people who are introduced
to using associations tend to rely on them to execute their
intended actions (Cook et al., 2005). In those experiments,
participants often reported an annoyance when they discov-
ered that experimenters had misinformed them about the
context they would be in when they needed to complete a
time-based intention. In such instances, predicting an
incorrect context is worse than not predicting one at all.
As stated before, knowing the context of the speciﬁc task
change does not improve performance when the cue occurs
during the interruption. Therefore, based on the results from
the previous experiment, the locus of the effects found when
the cue occurs in the ongoing task may be a combination of
both forming more speciﬁc associations and being reminded
by the reinstatement of the ongoing task as shown in
Experiment 2. In other words, we are still somewhat unclear
whether the association to the ongoing task or the association
to the future critical context, or both, creates the beneﬁt to
prospective memory. Although additional empirical work
will be needed to resolve these issues, the current experiment
is entirely consistent with the message that researchers in this
area must begin to critically evaluate the role that associa-
tions to current and to future contexts play when an intention
is encoded into and/or retrieved from memory.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Einstein et al. (2000) designed the delayed-execute prospec-
tive memory paradigm to study the fate of intentions that
participants must maintain over brief intervals. In addition,
research suggests that interruptions decrease prospective
responding beyond the decrease associated with a delay
alone (e.g., Einstein et al., 2003; McDaniel et al., 2004).
We show that for younger adults, an interruption in an
ongoing activity proves to be quite deleterious to maintaining
the intention, thus replicating previous work. Our results,
however, do offer some novel insights about the precise effects
of interruptions on a delayed prospective memory. One
empirical contribution of the present study is that, generally
speaking, cues appearing in an interruption degrade intention
completion for younger adults even further (Experiments 1
2 The reader may have noticed that participants have less time to formulate
an intention for cue appears during the interruption rather than before it be-
cause the ongoing task trials are paced at 5 s, whereas the interrupting task is
paced at 3 s. We do not believe that this issue signiﬁcantly impacts the data
for two reasons. First, there was much more information to process in the
ongoing task when the cue occurred before the interruption; during the
interrupting task, there was only one word to process in order to generate
a single semantic associate. Second, Einstein et al. (2003) increased
encoding time from 2 s to 6 s (i.e., a three-fold increase) when they gave
their participants implementation instructions to imagine the task change
and this manipulation did not affect performance. We believe that the type
of cognitive processing that occurs when the cue is received inﬂuences per-
formance rather than the duration of cue presentation as mentioned earlier in
the context of the results from Experiment 1.
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and 2). Another novel contribution is that reinstating the
context of the interrupted task can improve remembering over
these short delays (Experiment 2). Finally, forming speciﬁc
associations to future contexts (and being accurate when
doing so) may under some conditions ameliorate the difﬁ-
culties people have maintaining intentions over short delays
(Experiment 3).
The theoretical contribution of the present experiments
highlights two aspects of intention completion that previous
work using the delayed-execute paradigm (and the associ-
ated research using interruptions) has left unaddressed.
Both aspects concern the natural contextual associations that
may be formed during intention encoding, namely, the
association of the intention to the prevailing context and
the association of the intention to the future context of inten-
tion completion. Concerning the former, previous instantia-
tions of the use of interruptions in the delayed-execute
paradigm had participants return to the task in which the
cue to form the intention appeared. The very large effect of
removing those reinstatement trials in Experiment 2 demon-
strates that the prevailing context in which an intention is
formed becomes associated with that intention. Performance
suffers markedly without that contextual reinstatement. We
know of very little empirical work that highlights the fact
that the circumstances surrounding intention completion
affects its probability of completion (but see McDaniel,
Robinson-Riegler, & Einstein, 1998). Therefore, scientists
interested in prospective memory should consider carefully
how an association to the context in which an intention is
formed affects performance.
If contextual associations of intention formation affect
performance as we believe the data from this study demon-
strate, one must wonder about the fate of intentions that are
refreshed in new contexts. If one forms an intention in a
particular context and refreshes it in a new context, do those
new contexts become associated with the intention in a way
that may actually reduce the likelihood of fulﬁlling them? Do
all of these contextual associations improve or decrease the
probability of actual intention fulﬁllment? Can an intention
become decontextualized to the point of being free from an
association to any context (e.g., Conway, Gardiner, Perfect,
Anderson, & Cohen, 1997)? Are these effects localized to
only short-term maintenance of intentions as studied here
or do they generalize to longer-term intentions as well?
Regardless of the ultimate answers to these interrelated
Gedanken experiments, the important point is that associa-
tions to the prevailing context at intention formation is
currently a poorly understood phenomenon in the prospec-
tive memory literature. Consequently, the present results
highlight the fact that this may represent a fruitful avenue
of theoretical inquiry.
The other contextual association that is important to
prospective memory is the future context one expects to be
in at the time intention completion is anticipated or required.
As noted in the introduction, this contextual association has
been recognized as inﬂuencing intention completion (Cook
et al., 2005; Nowinski & Dismukes, 2005). Earlier we
argued that one locus of the poor performance when the
cue occurs in the interrupting task is the deactivation of the
components of the interrupting task and inadvertently along
with the intention itself. Having participants speciﬁcally
form an association to the task requiring the prospective
response improved performance when the cue occurred prior
to the interruption. Although it did not improve performance
when the cue occurred during the interruption, general
performance in that condition was equated to the level of
when the cue occurred prior to the interrupting task. As such,
we observed an overall beneﬁt to having participants form
speciﬁc associations that removed the deﬁcit that came from
having the cue appear during the interrupting task. This ﬁnd-
ing is important to consider when dealing with interruptions
in our daily lives.
Interruptions have become a staple of our jobs or lifestyles
and eliminating them is likely an exercise in futility. Inter-
ruptions and multitasking, for example, are pervasive in
emergency rooms and other workplace settings and can often
result in serious accidents (Chisholm, Collison, Nelson, &
Cordell, 2000; Gawande et al., 2003). Disruptions in cogni-
tive processing can often result in failures to return appropri-
ately to the interrupted task (Dodhia & Dismukes, 2009).
Even when performing habitual tasks that contain multiple
steps, disruptions tend to increase the risk of omitting steps
(Loukopoulos, Dismukes, & Barshi, 2009). Dodhia and
Dismukes argue that these failures may be due to new
attentional demands that prevent encoding a sort of restore
point for the interrupted task or because we do not pause
for a moment to check the status of the interrupted task.
Previous research on delayed-execute prospective memory
and interruptions has examined performance under
conditions that return participants to the interrupted task
(Einstein et al., 2003). Such an experimental task, however,
might reﬂect a best-case scenario associated with interrup-
tions at the cost of ecological validity. Given the complexity
of daily activities, we advocate investigating intentions in a
variety of contexts, including when interrupted task are
resumed automatically, resumed more effortfully, or are
skipped. As Dodhia and Dismukes point out, because
the environment may not typically return people to
interrupted tasks (only 48% of participants did so after the
interruption in their experiment, but see Law, Logie,
Pearson, Moretti, and Dimarco (2004) for higher return rates
in a multitasking environment), understanding the differ-
ences between these conditions would be useful. They
showed that providing either an explicit reminder at the
beginning of the interruption, or a sufﬁcient pause of 8 to
12 s after the interruption, were the best ways to increase
the likelihood of returning to the task. These reminders can
be very useful given the fact that participants tend not to
think about intentions during breaks (Finstad et al., 2006;
but see Hicks, Marsh, & Russell, 2000 and Sellen, Louie,
Harris, & Wilkins, 1997). Thus, consciously recalling an
action that one last executed before the interruption may be
a necessary step to temper the severely detrimental effects
of interruptions.
Failing to return to the interrupted task is consistent with
what happened in our no-reinstatement condition, which
resulted in worse performance compared with reinstating
the interrupted context. Our manipulation of reinstatement
was automatic because the experimental paradigm resumed
the interrupted task for participants without requiring them
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to think strategically about restoring their activity after the
interruption. We do not yet understand how reinstating the
interrupted context on one’s own compares with having
the environment do so automatically for delayed intentions at
future task changes. Self-initiating a return to the interrupted
context may serve to reactivate the intention to a greater degree
than would an environmental reminder, but one’s ability to
engage in a self-initiated reinstatement will likely depend on
task demands and working-memory capacity. We expect that
those with greater working-memory capacities will likely
beneﬁt from both types of reinstatement, whereas others may
only beneﬁt from those provided automatically by the environ-
ment. Although Ball et al. (2013) found those with higher
working-memory capacity performed better with interrup-
tions, empirical questions regarding contextual reinstatement
are up for further scrutiny in the laboratory. Nevertheless,
nature may offer up a variety of environments that may
not be as kind as those experienced in the laboratory may,
so we should consider ways to protect ourselves from the
harmful effects of interruptions.
Dismukes and colleagues (Dismukes, 2012; Dodhia &
Dismukes, 2009) offer some advice to improve various
forms of prospective memory. They recommend avoiding
multiple tasks when one is very important, forming imple-
mentation intentions, linking intentions to habitual tasks,
using external memory aids, and establishing cross-checking
devices. Such recommendations are seen in some real-world
situations where checklists are used to track completed and
uncompleted tasks in the emergency room and in the cockpit
(Gawande, 2010). When encountering interruptions, they
suggest pausing at the interruption and encoding an explicit
intention to resume the interrupted task after the interruption.
Our results are very consistent with their recommendations.
Forming an intention to return to an interrupted task would
be very useful not only to return to that task, but also to
remember previously stored intentions to complete at a task
change. Using cross-checking devices that log our actions
before dealing with an interruption would certainly help
reinstate the interrupted task, which we have shown amelio-
rates the negative effect of interruptions in Experiments 1
and 2. In addition to the suggestions by Dodhia and
Dismukes, data from our Experiment 3 suggest that linking
intentions to a future context be added to the list, yet our
previous research suggests that some discretion would be
helpful because predicting the incorrect future context could
be both harmful to intention completion and an annoyance
(Cook et al., 2005). Finally, our work also suggests not
trying to form intentions during an interruption. If doing so
were unavoidable, elaborating on the intention by writing it
down and creating an external memory aid would likely
prove very useful.
We designed the current set of experiments to investigate
memory for delayed intentions that are formed before and
during interruptions rather than to disambiguate between
either a contextual-association account or an inhibition
account. Perhaps the effects of interruptions are inﬂuenced
by both mechanisms. Experiment 2, in particular, shows
that associations can reduce the negative effect of an
interruption. By contrast, worse prospective memory for
intentions formed during an interruption may support an
inhibition account unless intentions are not fully formu-
lated during interruptions.
Although we focused on prospective memory accuracy in
the present study, future research could examine how inter-
ruptions affect the speed of responding to trials during either
the ongoing task or the intention. In a multitasking paradigm,
Law et al. (2004) found that their interruptions produced
timing costs on tasks rather than accuracy deﬁcits (See also
Speier, Valacich, & Vessey, 1999). Although we found
profound negative effects of interruptions in terms of accu-
racy consistently in our experiments, interruptions that may
not produce accuracy deﬁcits might reveal response-time
deﬁcits. Examining response times could also help to under-
stand if the effect of interruptions on prospective memory
results, at least in part, from inhibition processes. Consistent
with an inhibition account, memory for ongoing task stimuli
is negatively affected by maintaining either an event-based
or a time-based intention (Cook, Marsh, Clark-Foos, &
Meeks, 2007). For some measures of prospective memory
(viz., task interference, cue interference), response times to
stimuli or cues have been used to provide a more sensitive
measure of the costs of holding an intention in memory
(Marsh et al., 2006; Marsh, Hicks, Cook, Hansen, & Pallos,
2003; Smith, 2003). The same may be true when examining
how interruptions affect prospective memory. If backward
inhibition inﬂuences delayed-execute performance, the ﬁrst
trial or two following a task reinstatement after an interrup-
tion should be slower than trials before the interruption.
Those same trials should potentially be faster than the ﬁrst
trials in the switch task, especially if participants believe that
they need to return to the abandoned ongoing task after the
interruption (Hübner et al., 2003) because backward
inhibition of an abandoned task seems to be due an endoge-
nous preparation for the new task (Mayr & Keele, 2000).
Little, if any, endogenous preparation would be made for
unpredictable task switches. Such a pattern in response times
would be consistent with our data showing worse perfor-
mance in the no-reinstatement conditions because our
participants believed that they would need to return to the
interrupted task. From a reminder perspective, however, if
reinstating the ongoing task serves as a reminder about the
intention formed earlier, the reminder might interfere with
performing the reinstated task and slow down responding
in a way similar to the slowing on event-based cue trials
(Marsh et al., 2003). Although teasing apart these mecha-
nisms might require cleverly designed experiments, examin-
ing this microstructure of interruptions would be important
for understanding why or how interruptions hurt prospective
memory and how context can attenuate that damage.
In closing, we have proposed an associative-reminder
mechanism to explain better prospective memory for cues
that occur in reinstated contexts over those that occur during
interruptions. We also proposed an inhibitory mechanism to
explain worse performance for intentions formed during
interruptions relative to those formed before interruptions.
One or both of these mechanisms may inﬂuence our results
and we admit that our current data do not disambiguate
between those mechanisms. Nevertheless, we believe that
our data highlight an important concern about the fate of
intentions formulated before and during interruptions and
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how to prevent memory failures associated with interrup-
tions. Given the fact that interruptions of various types
represent a frequent occurrence during a typical day for most
people, additional research could help understand whether
the type of interruption may interact with the mechanism of
remembering our intentions. Additionally, more work is
needed to verify whether these same overarching effects
would be found with other types of prospective memory
tasks (e.g., more naturalistic tasks and time-based tasks)
and whether contextual mechanisms inﬂuence those types
of delayed-execute intentions more generally or whether
the effects are task speciﬁc.
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